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Moral Argument and the Justification of Policy: New Labour’s Case 
for Welfare Reform 
 
 
This article proposes a framework for exploring how politicians use moral arguments 
to win support for their policies.  It proceeds from the premise that the formulation of 
such arguments is mediated by three factors that constitute a general context of 
justification - ‘ideology,’ ‘argumentation’ and ‘hegemonic competition.’  For 
analytical purposes, the framework reconstructs the process of justification as one in 
which argumentative strategies are selected, modified and utilised in the light of these 
factors.  The framework is applied to New Labour’s case for the New Deals and 
Flexible New Deal.  The analysis reveals that these initiatives and the moral 
arguments used to promote them are broadly consistent with New Labour’s ideology; 
the arguments are appropriate to the policies; and that New Labour succeeded in 




The justification of policy is an integral part of democratic politics.  From the annual 
party conference to the House of Commons, a television interview, or a general 
election manifesto, politicians seek to win support for their party’s legislative and 
policy programme in a variety of settings.  There is a range of justificatory strategies 
available and a politician may attempt to sell a policy by claiming, for instance, that it 
is justified on pragmatic grounds, by reference to tradition, or perhaps because public 
opinion demands it (Cook, 1980, 514-516).  The stakes involved are high, as a well-
chosen argument can ensure the successful passage of legislation through Parliament 
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or help to secure an election victory.  To maximise its chances of success, a party 
must consider a number of factors when formulating an argumentative strategy to 
promote a new policy initiative.  They include the history of the policy area or 
programme, the need for consistency between their chosen argument and the party’s 
core values, the prevailing political climate, and the audience they will address.  By 
the same token, scholars must take these same factors into consideration if they are to 
supply a full account of the dynamics of political justification.     
 
Politicians often appeal to moral principles and arguments in their efforts to sell new 
policy programmes.  Thus, they typically make the case for initiatives in the area of 
welfare by reference to the increase in well-being - or, more generally, the positive 
consequences - the policy will produce, and they frequently invoke human rights or 
liberties when seeking to persuade people to back constitutional reforms.  The 
promotion of community responsibilities, meanwhile, is most often justified by 
reference to the fostering of civic virtue and the common good.  It is important to 
note, however, that in making arguments of this kind, politicians are not seeking to 
claim that a policy is morally right in the sense that it fulfils the criteria supplied by a 
particular moral theory.  Rather, their goal is to achieve a consensus in the policy area 
concerned, and moral arguments – used in conjunction with various rhetorical 
strategies – can enable them to do so.  With this in mind, the article examines moral 
argument from the perspective of politics rather than through the lens of moral 
philosophy, and thus seeks to offer a ‘politicised’ conception of moral argument. 
 
Given the prevalence of moral language in contemporary political argument, it is 
surprising that its role in making the case for policy initiatives has to date received 
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little attention from scholars.  Therefore, the primary task of this article is to facilitate 
exploration of this hitherto neglected area by proposing a theoretical framework that 
will enable us to disaggregate and reconstruct the process by which politicians select, 
formulate and employ moral arguments within a democratic context.  To demonstrate 
the utility of this approach, the article brings the framework to bear on New Labour’s 
moral arguments for its welfare reforms.     
 
Towards an Understanding of the Dynamics of Moral Argument in Politics 
 
A core assumption of this article is that the formulation of moral arguments is 
mediated by three factors, which constitute a general ‘context of justification’ - a 
context of ideology, a context of argumentation, and a context of hegemonic 
competition.1  The key themes within the ‘context of ideology’ are the 
‘morphological’ character of ideology, and the process of ‘decontestation,’ by which 
meaning is assigned to its constituent concepts. Meanwhile, the ‘context of 
argumentation,’ within which moral principles may be utilised in political arguments, 
is concerned with the question of how the different requirements of argumentation in 
various policy areas may influence the choice of justificatory strategy.  Finally, the 
‘context of hegemonic competition’ addresses the issue of how political parties secure 
advantage over their opponents in rhetorical competitions.  I now outline these three 
elements in turn. 
 
In his theory of ideological morphology, Freeden proposes that an ideology consists 
of a cluster of core concepts, a number of adjacent concepts, and a periphery 
composed of ideas that are insignificant relative to the core (1996, 77).  These 
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concepts are given meaning through the process of decontestation, by which each is 
rotated ‘through a range of meanings until one of those meanings is held vis-à-vis the 
similarly held, or decontested, meanings of every other concept’ (Freeden, 1996, 83).  
In this way, a coherent, integrated ideological platform is generated.  Policy proposals 
are located on the perimeter of an ideology and link its constituent concepts to the 
social world (Freeden, 1996, 79-80).  Politicians often promote these proposals by 
appealing to moral arguments, which should themselves be as consistent as possible 
with both the policy proposal concerned and the decontested meanings of the 
ideology’s constituent concepts.  Such consistency is attainable through cultural 
adjacency, which avoids logical criticism by ‘creating [culturally] acceptable 
connections between terms and arguments’ (Freeden, 1996, 85).  Hence, the 
requirements of argumentation can supply further reference points for decontestation.  
  
The ‘context of argumentation’ encompasses the three main traditions of Western 
moral philosophy, namely consequentialism, deontology and virtue theory.  Because 
this article examines moral argument from a political – as opposed to a philosophical 
– perspective, it is important to note that there are differences in how moral 
philosophers characterise these paradigms and how politicians employ them to win 
support for their policies.  Thus, I will provide the standard definitions of the three 
theories that are acceptable to moral philosophers, before giving examples of the 
broader way in which actual politicians use them.   
 
As Scheffler explains, consequentialism states that the rightness of an act is 
determined by whether it maximises well-being, as judged from an impartial 
perspective that gives equal consideration to the interests of all (1988, 1).  In a 
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political context, this mode of argumentation is typically used in the area of welfare, 
where politicians emphasise the increase in - though not necessarily the maximisation 
of - well-being a policy will produce or, more generally, its positive consequences.  A 
case in point is New Labour’s ongoing campaign to encourage people to give up 
smoking to improve their own health and that of others (Department of Health, 2007).  
Contemporary deontology, meanwhile, emphasises natural rights, the result of which 
is that ‘the language of rights has become a well-established part of popular moral 
discourse’.  These rights are accompanied by obligations, which people must accept 
in exchange for the privilege of exercising their rights (Scarre, 1996, 12).  
Deontological reasoning frequently appears in politicians’ arguments to promote 
constitutional reforms such as the Human Rights Act of 1998, a measure New Labour 
claimed would protect and uphold the human rights of every UK citizen (Labour 
Party, 2005, 111).  Finally, virtue theory emphasises the ‘virtuous individual and on 
those inner traits, dispositions, and motives that qualify her as being virtuous’ (Slote, 
1997, 177).  Politicians often employ this form of moral argument to sell policies 
relating to community, an example being the introduction of citizenship education to 
the National Curriculum in 2002 (Atkins, 2008, 134).  For New Labour, this initiative 
would both inculcate civic virtues in children and promote the common good through 
the creation of a ‘healthy national political culture’ (Landrum, 2002, 221).   
 
Finally, the ‘context of hegemonic competition’ invites consideration of how the 
desire to win rhetorical competitions may further influence the selection and 
modification of argumentative strategies.  Thus, a party may choose a particular 
strategy because it appeals to the commonsense intuitions of the electorate, or 
because it offers the best available means of undermining the arguments of an 
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opponent.  An argument may also be selected because it is logically and/or culturally 
consistent with the party’s ideological commitments, and hence is more likely to be 
convincing than one that contradicts them.  Politicians enhance the effectiveness of 
their justificatory strategies with a range of rhetorical devices (see inter alia Myers, 
2000; Charteris-Black, 2005; Finlayson, 2007), and an examination of these 
techniques will enable us to take into account the ‘emotional as well as the 
intellectual attractiveness of arguments’ (Freeden, 1996, 37).   
 
Using this understanding of the ‘context of justification’ as a starting-point, the article 
offers a three-fold analytical framework, which is applied to investigate the use of 
moral argument in contemporary politics.  The three stages are:  
1. An examination of how particular principles and arguments may be made 
answerable to an integrated ideological platform.  
2. An examination of how particular forms of argument may be deployed 
compellingly with respect to specific types of policy.  
3. An examination of how argumentative strategies may be formulated in ways 
that provide an opportunity to secure hegemonic advantage in a competitive, 
rhetorical political situation.  
Although there may be grounds for thinking the ‘context of ideology’ is more 
fundamental than the other contexts, they may in practice rebound back on each other.  
Thus, the process outlined here is neither linear nor hierarchical, and a clear 
explanation of the strategic decision-making process underlying the justification of 
policy is possible only when all three stages have been considered.  It is also worth 
noting that these stages do not represent the procedure by which actual politicians 
choose particular moral principles and arguments.  Rather, they form analytical 
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strands in a reconstruction of the process by which argumentative strategies are 
selected, modified and utilised.  The framework will therefore enable us to give a non-
reductive account of this process, while remaining sensitive to the potentially 
conflicting considerations that enter into it and are implicit in articulations of moral 
argument.  
 
In the remainder of this article, I employ the framework to elucidate the procedure by 
which New Labour formulated and applied moral arguments to sell its welfare 
reforms.  In the following section, I outline the main features of the New Deals and 
their successor: the Flexible New Deal.  Next, I explore the relationship between these 
initiatives and New Labour’s ideological platform.  I then consider the moral 
arguments used to justify them, and I show that these arguments are consistent with 
both New Labour’s ideological commitments and the policies themselves.  In the final 
section, I examine the tactics that New Labour deployed in its efforts to achieve 
hegemonic advantage in the area of welfare policy.   
 
New Labour’s Welfare Reforms 
 
The primary objective of the New Deals was to enable unemployed people to 
‘compete effectively for the jobs that are continually being created in Britain’s 
dynamic labour market’ (HM Treasury, 2000, 10).  This programme was based on a 
policy framework endorsed by the OECD (Carcillo and Grubb, 2006) that consists of 
three elements, of which the first is active labour market policies.  These initiatives 
are intended to provide unemployed individuals with help and support that is tailored 
to meet their needs, and thus will enable them to reconnect with the job market.  The 
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second element consists of policies designed to ‘make work pay,’ such as the National 
Minimum Wage and Tax Credits, while the third comprises initiatives to tackle the 
barriers that prevent people from returning to work (HM Treasury and DWP, 2003, 
2).  One such obstacle was the shortage of good quality, affordable of childcare 
facilities, which New Labour sought to rectify through its National Childcare 
Strategy.  Other barriers include discrimination and poor basic skills, and in April 
2002 New Labour introduced Jobcentre Plus to tackle them.  This agency provides a 
range of services, including training and access to childcare, and is intended to be 
flexible, work-focused and suited to the needs of each individual.  The issues involved 
here are frequently multi-dimensional, so a ‘partnership approach between a number 
of Government departments, other public sector bodies, employers and the 
community and voluntary sectors’ is required (HM Treasury and DWP, 2003, 50). 
 
New Labour launched the New Deal for Young People (NDYP) in April 1998. This 
scheme was targeted at young people aged between 18 and 24 who were receiving 
Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA).  After six months of ‘open’ unemployment, 
participants entered a four-month ‘gateway’ period, in which they were assigned a 
personal adviser who helps them to acquire ‘any needed basic skills (such as 
punctuality, how to compose a CV, and so forth) and engage in a serious job search’ 
(Waltman, 2009, 126).  If, at the end of this phase, they had not found unsubsidised 
employment, participants had to accept one of four options, the first of which is a 
subsidised job that included training and lasted for up to six months.  To this was later 
added the opportunity to participate in self-employment ‘Test Trading,’ during which 
the young person could ‘experience the realities of self-employment while still 
receiving support and guidance from a provider’ (Department for Social 
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Development, 2006).  The second option was a six-month work experience and 
training placement with a voluntary organisation, while the third was six months of 
work experience with an environmental task force, including training.  The fourth 
option was up to 12 months of full-time education for those lacking basic skills, 
during which JSA continues (Driver and Martell, 2006, 97).  After the Options phase, 
participants who had not found employment entered the ‘follow through’ period, 
which offered further guidance and support for up to six months.  The programme 
was mandatory, so ‘the receipt of benefit is conditional on willingness to accept offers 
of work or training.  Failure to do so is penalised by loss of benefit’ (Shaw, 2007, 47).   
 
According to New Labour, the NDYP was a great success, helping to reduce youth 
unemployment by 75 per cent.  The next step, however, was to address the question of 
how to help economically inactive individuals into work (Labour Party, 2001, 26).  
Against the Conservatives, who had neglected this group during their time in 
government, New Labour argued that although people may be economically inactive 
due to caring responsibilities or disability, it does not follow that they are uninterested 
in, or incapable of, work.  As a result, ‘the benefit system needs to do more to help 
and encourage people on inactive benefits to return to work’ (HM Treasury and DWP, 
2003, 49).  To this end, New Labour introduced the New Deal for Lone Parents 
(NDLP) on a national scale in April 1998.  This programme was aimed at lone parents 
whose youngest child is under 16 and who are either unemployed or working for 
fewer than 16 hours a week.  Although participation in the scheme was voluntary, 
lone parents are required to attend an interview, at which they received ‘personal 
adviser support, help with childcare and training, and financial incentives’ (DWP, 
2007, 19).  Benefit penalties applied if they failed to do so (Clarke, 2007, 159).  In 
 10 
2006, New Labour proposed to increase the frequency of these interviews to six-
monthly for lone parents whose youngest child is under 11, and to quarterly for those 
whose youngest child is aged 11 or over (DWP, 2006a, 8).  The government 
subsequently toughened its stance by ending the automatic entitlement to Income 
Support for lone parents with children aged 12 or over from November 2008, and in 
October 2010 the qualifying age will fall to seven (DWP, 2007, 44).   
 
New Labour expanded the New Deals to offer voluntary programmes to people on 
other inactive benefits.  The New Deal for Partners was introduced in April 1999 to 
help the partners of unemployment benefit claimants back into work.  It was followed 
twelve months later by the New Deal 50 Plus, which was aimed at people aged 50 or 
above who had been in receipt of JSA/Income Support or incapacity benefits for at 
least six months (Millar, 2000, iv).  The next initiative was the New Deal 25+, which 
was rolled out nationally from April 2001 and targeted people aged 25 and above who 
had been unemployed for eighteen months or more.  Finally, the New Deal for 
Disabled People was introduced in July 2001 to help incapacity benefit claimants to 
find work.2   
 
In October 2009, New Labour introduced the Flexible New Deal (FND) to replace the 
NDYP and the ND25+ in some areas.3  A second phase will follow in October 2010.  
Under this scheme, a person’s first twelve months on JSA is divided into three stages, 
during which the support they receive from Jobcentre Plus increases.  
Correspondingly, participants are required to intensify their efforts to find work 
(DWP, 2008a, 12-13).  After twelve months, jobseekers transfer to the FND, a scheme 
delivered by private and third sector providers who will give them the ‘individual, 
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personalised support’ they need to enable them to find work (DWP, 2008b, 8).  These 
providers receive payment ‘according to how many clients they get into work with 
significant discretion over how they achieve that goal’ (Mulheirn and Menne, 2008, 
10).  All participants must undertake a minimum of four weeks’ work experience 
during this time, and there are tough sanctions for those who refuse the support 
offered. 
 
In sum, the New Deals and FND were intended to help individuals from several target 
groups to find employment, and offered them a range of incentives - such as Tax 
Credits and the National Minimum Wage - to do so.  These policy programmes, 
which propose a number of means for achieving a specific end, suggest the use of a 
consequentialist argument.    
     
The Compatibility of New Labour’s Welfare Policies and their Supporting 
Arguments with its Ideological Platform 
 
The ‘context of ideology’ invites consideration of whether the arguments New 
Labour deployed in support of its welfare reforms, and the policies themselves, are 
congruent with its core ideological commitments.  Freeden identifies these concepts 
as equal worth, opportunity for all, responsibility, social justice, community and 
cohesion (1999, 48), and they have remained remarkably stable throughout New 
Labour’s time in government.  As such, they provide a solid basis for this analysis.  
For Brown and Darling, the New Deals accorded primarily with New Labour’s core 
value of equality of opportunity (2001, iii).  This is because a key objective of the 
scheme was to ensure that the labour market functions well for everyone in Britain, 
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and that nobody is prevented from obtaining work because, for instance, they have a 
disability or have children to look after (HM Treasury and DWP, 2003, 3).  New 
Labour linked this notion of opportunity for all to the values of equal worth and social 
inclusion, arguing that everyone who is able to work is entitled to have the 
opportunity to do so, and thus to have a stake in society, regardless of their 
circumstances (DWP, 2006b, vii).  These values are also evident in New Labour’s 
policies to tackle workplace discrimination and to remove other barriers that prevent 
people from finding employment.       
 
The New Deals and the arguments used to promote them manifested New Labour’s 
commitment to the goal of full employment, decontested as equality of opportunity 
for all (HM Treasury, 1997, 5).  By putting ‘work first,’ New Labour aimed to  
Secure social justice for those who too often have been left behind, and 
to enable them to realise their full potential, to the economic and social 
benefit of the whole community (Brown and Smith, 2003, i). 
As Driver points out, this strategy to boost the human capital of poorer people by 
giving them the skills they need to participate in the labour market constituted an 
attempt to manipulate the distribution of resources.  ‘In this way,’ he argues, 
‘opportunities are connected, in New Labour thinking, to outcomes’ (2004, 32).  By 
enacting policies to give people the opportunity to learn new skills and ultimately to 
find employment, New Labour sought to realise its goal of a strong, cohesive society 
in which everyone has a stake (Primarolo, 2004, 3).  At the same time, however, the 
principles of social justice demand that a ‘modern, civilised society must protect the 
most vulnerable within it’ (DWP, 2002, 5).  To this end, New Labour argued that 
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those who are able to work should have the opportunity to enter the job market, while 
those who are unable to should receive the security they need.   
 
According to Finlayson, a significant development of New Labour’s welfare reforms 
was the ‘emphasis on the individualisation of service delivery, and with it the 
encouragement of responsibility for gearing up for the new economy’ (2003, 164).  
That is, New Labour intended that participants in the New Deals would act 
responsibly and accept the opportunities offered, in return for the personalised 
programme of support and training they received (DWP, 2008b, 5).  The core New 
Labour value of reciprocal rights and responsibilities thus had a strong presence in the 
New Deals.  Indeed, it is explicit in the argument that government has an obligation to 
provide participants with real opportunities for training and work, while those able to 
do so have the responsibility to accept these offers - or at least to stop claiming 
benefits (Layard, 2001, 3). 
 
During its third term in office, New Labour introduced the FND, which is based on 
the notion of ‘opportunity for all and responsibility from all’ (DWP, 2008c, 17).  Like 
its predecessor, the FND is intended to make work pay, to which end it introduces 
new back to work credits, and to help people who can work to find employment while 
supporting those who cannot.  It also seeks to remove the barriers that prevent 
disadvantaged individuals entering the job market, thereby enabling them to 
contribute to the nation’s prosperity.  This active approach to welfare, Hain believes, 
will realise New Labour’s vision of an ‘inclusive, cohesive and prosperous society 
with fairness and social justice at its core’ (2007, 3).  Thus, the values of equal worth, 
opportunity for all, community, cohesion and social justice are present in the FND.  
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A key difference between the two programmes is that the FND imposes greater 
conditionality on both jobseekers and training providers.  For participants, this new 
approach is summarised as ‘more support matched by higher expectations’ (DWP, 
2008c, 16).  As such, they must act responsibly by preparing for, searching for and 
accepting employment in exchange for the flexible, personalised support they receive.  
Those who fail to comply with the scheme are subject to a tougher sanctions regime, 
and there is a new requirement for the long-term unemployed to engage in a 
programme of full-time work experience (DWP, 2008a, 37).  Providers, meanwhile, 
are motivated to find work for people by the competition for contracts and payment 
by results (DWP, 2008c, 11).  Those who do not meet their targets risk having their 
contracts terminated early.  At first sight, this increased emphasis on reciprocal 
responsibilities suggests a shift to the right in New Labour’s thinking on welfare.  
However, when we consider the goals of the programme – namely the creation of a 
fairer, more cohesive community, in which 80 per cent of people are in work and no 
child is growing up in poverty (Hain, 2007, 3) – it is clear that this shift is in means 
only; the ends remain recognisably social democratic.4    
 
Although the New Deals and FND appear to be consistent with New Labour’s 
ideology, a problem arises when we consider their practical implications.  In both 
schemes, as Hickson correctly points out, the burden of responsibility falls primarily 
on those at the bottom of society, who New Labour deems to be socially excluded, 
‘with no corresponding duties, such as the responsibility to pay higher direct taxation, 
falling on those at the top’ (2004, 133).  This has resulted in the exclusion of the rich 
(Finlayson, 2010, 15), which violates New Labour’s commitment to the values of 
social justice and community cohesion.  It also undermines the value of equal worth, 
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on the ground that if every individual matters equally, it follows that no one should be 
excluded from the reciprocal responsibilities that underpin a strong, cohesive 
community (Atkins, 2010, 52).  There were further disparities between New Labour’s 
arguments for its welfare reforms and their practical effects but, as we will see in the 
remainder of the article, they did not prevent it from achieving a consensus in this 
area of policy.                                 
 
The Moral Arguments Used to Justify New Labour’s Welfare Reforms 
 
As stated above, politicians typically make the case for welfare reforms by reference 
to the amount of well-being or the positive consequences they will produce.  The 
congruence between consequentialist reasoning (broadly conceived) and the area of 
welfare policy makes this mode of moral argument particularly suitable for selling 
such initiatives, and it is therefore unsurprising that a tripartite consequentialist 
argument constituted the primary case for the New Deals.  The first strand of this 
argument focused on the benefits for participants in the schemes.  According to the 
DWP, exclusion from the labour market can produce a range of negative 
consequences for individuals, which include loss of daily routine, a sense of purpose, 
and self-esteem (2002, 1).  In contrast, work is beneficial because it ‘strengthens 
independence and dignity.  It builds family aspirations… and can improve an 
individual’s health and well-being’ (DWP, 2006a, 2).  Thus, by moving people off 
benefits and into work, the New Deals were intended to ‘transform the lives of 
millions, by making them self-sustaining rather than dependent - a hand-up not a 
hand-out’ (Layard, 2001, 6).  
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The second strand of New Labour’s consequentialist argument emphasised the 
positive effects of the New Deals on society as a whole.  New Labour identified areas 
of the country in which unemployment is higher than average, and claimed that 
people with disabilities, lone parents and people from minority ethnic groups are often 
disproportionately concentrated within these regions. Such individuals may 
experience multiple difficulties, including poor-quality public transport and rising 
crime, which ultimately lead to social exclusion (DWP, 2006a, 10).  The goal of the 
New Deals was, in the words of Andrew Smith, the former Employment Minister, to 
promote social inclusion by bringing ‘employment, training and benefits to people in 
the right way, so that they have the standard and quality of life that we want in a 
civilised society’ (Hansard 19 December 1997, col. 627, vol. 303).  This would 
enable people to contribute to - and have a stake in - society, thus benefiting the wider 
community by breaking the cycle of exclusion, crime and deprivation that blights 
Britain’s poorest neighbourhoods (HM Treasury and DWP, 2003, 50).  However, 
despite their success in reducing unemployment - particularly among the under-25s - 
New Labour’s policies had little impact on in-work poverty, a condition linked to 
such factors as part-time employment, low pay, and a lack of job retention or job 
progression (Kenway, 2008, 8; Smith and Middleton, 2007, 13).  As several studies 
have shown that people who are in in-work poverty are more likely to experience 
reduced well-being and social exclusion (see Smith and Middleton, 2007, 71-72), 
New Labour’s linkage of paid employment and social inclusion appears tenuous. 
 
Finally, New Labour emphasised the positive consequences of the New Deals for 
Britain’s economy.  This argument proceeded from the premise that people’s skills 
and education are key determinants of productivity growth and economic performance 
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(HM Treasury, DWP and DfES, 2004, 7).  Hence, the New Deals, which were 
designed to give people the opportunity to acquire new skills, would allow businesses 
to flourish and thus promote economic growth.  They would also challenge the trade-
off between equality and efficiency that prevailed in the 1980s by simultaneously 
creating economic prosperity and promoting social justice (Brown, 1994, 19).  In 
practice, however, it was estimated that in 2006 ‘as many as a third of all adults of 
working age lacked any recognised skills at all, or were at best low-skilled’ (Taylor, 
2007, 234).  These individuals are more likely to be unemployed or in low-paid jobs, 
and thus to be socially excluded.  If we take this point together with figures which 
show that UK productivity in 2007 (in terms of GDP per worker) was 7 per cent 
below that of France and 23 per cent less than that of the US (Office for National 
Statistics, 2009, 1), then it seems New Labour’s attempts to reconcile economic 
efficiency and social justice failed. 
 
The consequentialist case for the New Deals was supported by a secondary 
deontological argument, which drew on New Labour’s core concept of reciprocal 
rights and responsibilities.  According to Blair, ‘everyone able to do so has a clear 
responsibility to find a job and look after their family’ (2001, 2).  In return, 
government has an obligation to ensure that they receive the help they need to find 
suitable training or work.  The coercive aspect of the New Deals was designed to 
ensure that all unemployed people of working age were made aware of their options, 
and thus would be in a position to take responsibility for themselves.  After all, one of 
the main goals of New Labour’s welfare reforms was to tackle the ‘culture of 
dependency’ and ensure that ‘people should not be free to choose a life on benefit’ 
(Shaw, 2007, 46).       
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A further motivation for the compulsory aspect of the New Deals is evident in 
Darling’s statement that New Labour’s welfare policies were based on a  
Moral case for reform which reflects the duty we owe to our children to 
build a welfare state fit for their future...  If we do nothing these children 
will not only be born poor, they will live poor, and die poor (1999, 35).    
Blair’s pledge to eradicate child poverty within a generation gave this claim additional 
force (1999, 1), and in the same year his government set targets to reduce child 
poverty by 25 per cent by 2004-05, 50 per cent by 2010-11, and eventually to 
eradicate it by 2020.  However, despite some initial progress towards these goals, 
New Labour failed to meet its first target and – notwithstanding the recession – is still 
far from achieving its second.  Given that at least 50 per cent of children living in 
poverty in 2008 were in working families, it seems that welfare-to-work schemes 
alone are not enough to alleviate child poverty, and that an overhaul of the taxation 
and benefit systems is therefore required (Kenway, 2008, 7-8, 4). 
 
Despite these problems, New Labour continued to argue as if the New Deals had 
achieved their stated aims, and indeed hailed them as ‘the most successful innovation 
in the history of the UK labour market’ (DWP, 2008b, 6).  It is unsurprising, then, that 
the arguments for the FND closely resemble those used to sell the New Deals, with 
New Labour claiming that this scheme would benefit individuals by improving their 
well-being, self-esteem, and future prospects.  New Labour also argues that the FND 
will have positive consequences for the community because it will improve the job 
prospects of those who face the greatest disadvantage, and thus will reduce social 
exclusion (DWP, 2007, 23, 5).  Here, New Labour again neglects the exclusion of the 
rich, though the emphasis on job retention and progression in the FND, together with 
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the introduction of new back to work credits, may help to alleviate in-work poverty 
(DWP, 2008c, 38).      
 
New Labour’s third consequentialist argument for the FND emphasises its benefits for 
the economy.  The DWP maintains that, by improving people’s skills, the programme 
will enable Britain to compete more effectively in the global economy by creating 
more jobs and more growth (2007, 27).  This renewed commitment to skills is evident 
in the introduction of increasingly personalised support and training through the FND, 
which perhaps constitutes a tacit recognition of the limited success of the New Deals 
in this area.  Finally, the deontological argument for the FND emphasises the 
increasing obligations that participants in the scheme must accept in exchange for this 
support, with New Labour asserting that ‘for those who are capable of working, there 
will be no right to a life on benefits’ (DWP, 2008a, 12).  A tougher sanctions regime 
underpins the responsibility to find work, while the greater conditionality imposed on 
training providers is designed to improve the efficacy of the scheme.  These changes, 
claimed the DWP, would set New Labour on course to achieving its targets of an 80 
per cent employment rate by 2015, and the eradication of child poverty by 2020 
(2008a, 26).       
 
Overall, the prima facie coherence between New Labour’s ideology, its moral 
arguments for its welfare reforms, and the policies themselves, creates an impression 
of integrity and competence that can be advantageous in rhetorical competitions, and 
thus constitutes one of New Labour’s strategies for securing hegemonic advantage in 
the area of welfare policy.  I examine the ‘context of hegemonic competition’ next.   
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New Labour’s Tactics for Securing Hegemonic Advantage 
 
The key premise of New Labour’s case for the New Deals and FND is that the 
Conservatives’ approach to welfare was seriously flawed.  Purdy explains that a 
residual welfare state began to emerge during the Thatcher and Major governments, 
which provided a ‘low-level safety net for the poor, while encouraging the majority of 
citizens to take care of themselves’ (2000, 183).  In practice, this meant that people 
received little or no help to find work, and by the mid-1990s, the number claiming 
inactive benefits had trebled.  For New Labour, the Conservatives’ passive approach 
to welfare fostered ‘benefit dependency, wasted talent and obstructed opportunity,’ 
and thereby trapped many people in long-term unemployment.  This in turn 
contributed to a sharp increase in child poverty, which had reached 3.4 million by 
1997 (DWP, 2008a, 24-25).   
 
However, the Conservatives were not wholly responsible for the growing culture of 
dependency, which in fact had been a problem since the early 1970s (Waltman, 2009, 
123).  Although the Thatcher government removed the requirement on benefit 
claimants to look for work in 1982, the introduction of Restart interviews in 1986 
marked the beginning of a more active approach to welfare that would challenge the 
dependency culture (Freud, 2007, 12).  The Major government consolidated this shift 
by introducing a Contract for Work, under which unemployed people were obliged to 
accept work if it is available, and by transforming unemployment benefit into JSA.  
This latter move both strengthened and formalised the connection between seeking 
work and claiming benefits and incorporated a number of programmes, such as 
‘restart’ and ‘job search plus,’ which were intended to help people find employment 
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(Johnson, 2001: 65).  Underpinning these developments was a desire to create a 
welfare system for a ‘self-help society not a help-yourself society’ that promoted 
independence by reconnecting more people with the job market (Major, 1996, 6).  The 
similarities between this approach and New Labour’s welfare reforms are striking, 
and it is therefore misleading to characterise the former as passive.  Nonetheless, it 
proved strategically useful for New Labour to do so, as we will see below. 
 
The consequentialist argument for the New Deals and FND draws on a narrative of 
welfare under the Conservatives, in which New Labour establishes relations of 
equivalence between high unemployment, poverty, wasted potential, community 
breakdown and social injustice.  Brown identifies the source of these difficulties as 
the New Right’s belief that ‘more inequality was essential to economic growth’ 
(1994, 1), and thus creates a linkage between Thatcherite ideology, economic 
inefficiency and social problems.  As Charteris-Black explains, such an association 
implies a causal relationship between these phenomena (2005, 97), which enables 
New Labour to hold the Conservatives directly responsible for Britain’s ills.  In so 
doing, New Labour deploys the strategy of ‘delegitimisation (of the other),’ which is 
intended to undermine and attack an opponent through the use of such techniques as 
marginalisation, censure, and the presentation of the other in a negative light (Chilton, 
2004, 47, parentheses in original).  
 
New Labour also used the technique of legitimisation to make its case for the New 
Deals.  Examples of this strategy include ‘positive self-presentation’ as manifested in 
acts of self-justification, and ‘self-identification as a source of authority, reason, 
vision and sanity’ (Chilton, 2004, 47).  New Labour deployed the latter to present its 
 22 
approach as the only viable solution to the problems created by the Conservative 
governments, with Blair claiming that ‘we are the only people who can be trusted to 
change, reform and modernise the welfare state, because we are the people who 
believe in it’ (1994, 7).  Here, Blair suggested that the Conservatives had seriously 
damaged the welfare state because they rejected the values on which it was built.  In 
contrast, New Labour upheld these values, and therefore was uniquely qualified to 
undertake the necessary reforms.  It was on this basis that Blair described the New 
Deals, which encouraged self-reliance and personal responsibility, as ‘the only way 
forward as we break the old culture which left generations of families trapped in 
unemployment and poverty’ (2001, 2, emphasis added).  
 
The New Deals were one of several initiatives designed to make work pay and help 
people into employment.  To this end, Brown claimed, we need an enabling state, 
which offers unemployed individuals a means of escaping poverty by ‘using the 
welfare state to foster responsibility and not to substitute for it.’  Indeed, he continued, 
again drawing on the deontological argument, ‘our guiding theme is not what the 
government can do for you but what the government can enable you to do for 
yourself’ (1994, 5).  This theme is also present in the FND commitment to creating a 
welfare state that will support people in developing their capabilities, in return for 
which they ought to act responsibly by taking full advantage of the opportunities 
offered to them (DWP, 2008a, 29).  The notion of enablement is significant, as it 
implies state intervention in accordance with Old Labour ideals but without the 
negative connotations of the latter.  Thus, New Labour could reassure its followers on 
the Left that it was acting in accordance with socialist values, while simultaneously 
avoiding the Thatcherite charge of excessive state interference.   
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A key component of New Labour’s enabling state is Jobcentre Plus, which delivers an 
‘active service to help people become independent and move from welfare into work’ 
(HM Treasury and DWP, 2001, 32).  Here, the word ‘active’ creates a link between 
New Labour’s approach and the activation strategies endorsed by the OECD and 
implemented by such nations as Finland and Norway.  These strategies share several 
features with the New Deals – such as the ‘regular reporting and monitoring of work 
availability and job-search actions,’ the focus on mutual responsibility and the use of 
sanctions to ensure compliance with the programme (OECD, 2007, 208) – that are 
given renewed emphasis in the FND.  By establishing this connection and claiming 
that the New Deals ‘incorporated lessons from… successful labour markets in Europe, 
especially Scandinavia’ (DWP, 2008b, 7), New Labour identifies its approach with 
the success of other schemes and thus gives its policies greater legitimacy.5 
 
The use of the word ‘active’ also creates an antagonism between the New Deals and 
FND on the one hand, and the Conservatives’ ‘passive’ approach, which New Labour 
blamed for encouraging welfare dependency, on the other.  In Charteris-Black’s 
terms, this is an example of ‘antithesis,’ in which a combination of ‘sequencing and 
comparison’ is utilised to contrast the Conservatives’ eighteen years in government 
with New Labour’s time in office (2005, 7).  Antithesis is a powerful tool in New 
Labour’s rhetorical arsenal because it allows the party to present itself as offering a 
positive solution to the economic and social problems that stem from poverty and 
high unemployment, while portraying the policies of the Thatcher and Major 
governments as an abject failure.   
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In arguing for its welfare reforms, New Labour also invoked the dire consequences 
that would follow if the issues of restricted opportunity and social deprivation were 
ignored.  Brown, for instance, asserted that unless action was taken to tackle these 
problems, Britain would ‘continue to drift towards a low-wage, low investment, low 
skills economy… with all the economic and social ills that brings.’  In these 
circumstances, he argued, there would be more low pay, slow economic growth, 
unemployment and poverty, while Britain’s communities would be at risk from the 
social problems associated with these phenomena (1994, 2; see also HM Treasury and 
DWP, 2003, 50).  This argument is an example of ‘emotive coercion,’ which can 
occur when utterances stimulate an emotional response in the listener in order to 
persuade them of a particular point of view.  Thus, an effect of this strand of the 
consequentialist argument may be to induce fear by ‘making truth claims, in the form 
of predictions, about causal effects’ (Chilton, 2004, 118) that could only be avoided 
by supporting the New Deals.  These arguments proved successful, as New Labour 
won sufficient support to ensure the passage of the New Deals onto the statute book.    
 
In January 2008, the Conservatives published their own proposals for welfare reform.  
These measures have obvious parallels with the New Deals and FND, with David 
Cameron adopting New Labour’s linkage of opportunity and responsibility, as well as 
its commitment to ‘help those who want to work into sustained employment, and cut 
benefits for those who refuse to work’ (2008: 1-2).  Echoing New Labour again, 
Cameron asserted that the Conservatives’ approach would offer some of Britain’s 
‘most deprived citizens the opportunity to live independent and fulfilling lives. Above 
all, they will help more people contribute to the responsible society I want to achieve’ 
(2008: 2).  These similarities indicate that the Conservatives accepted the basic 
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assumptions of New Labour’s policies, and that New Labour had therefore succeeded 




In conclusion, the application of the theoretical framework elaborated in this article 
offers insights into New Labour’s choice of argumentative strategy for the New Deals 
and FND.  It shows that these programmes and the moral arguments used to sell them 
are reasonably consistent with New Labour’s ideology; that the arguments themselves 
are appropriate to the policy area; and that New Labour’s choice of a primarily 
consequentialist strategy - supported by a number of rhetorical techniques - enabled it 
to set the agenda on welfare policy.  The framework thus enables us to expose and 
analyse the process by which politicians select, modify and apply moral arguments in 
their efforts to win support for their policy programmes.  It also allows us, through 
reference to the imperatives provided by the three aspects of the ‘context of 
justification,’ to explain why these argumentative strategies developed as they did.   
 
The utility of the framework goes beyond the case study analysed in this article.  It 
could be applied, for instance, to examine how New Labour uses moral language to 
win support for policies in other areas, such as constitutional reform and foreign 
policy.  The findings would, when taken together, provide a full account of the 
justificatory strategies employed by a single political party.  Equally, the framework 
could facilitate an examination of the ways in which other parties use moral 
arguments to sell policy, thus paving the way for a comparative analysis.  It could also 
provide a starting-point for a study of the modes of moral argument used by 
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politicians in democratic societies beyond Britain, though further research may be 
required beforehand.  This comprehensive and widely applicable framework thus 
provides a means for illuminating the complex and under-theorised process of moral 
justification in contemporary politics. 
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1 Here, I draw on Buckler’s (2007) framework for examining the role of ideas in politics.   
2 These benefits are Severe Disablement Allowance, Income Support with a disability premium, and 
Incapacity Benefit. 
3 In Northern Ireland, the ‘Steps to Work’ programme replaced the New Deals from September 2008 
(DETI, 2009).  
4 For further discussion of the distinction between ends and means in relation to New Labour, see Plant 
(2004). 
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